

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: LA PAZ

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TO: Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

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CURRENT IMPRESSION HERE THAT CASTRO REGAINING STRONG PRESTIGE. HE DOES NOT SHARE SOVIET DEFEAT BECAUSE (1) HIS FIRM STAND ON INSPECTION AND FIVE POINTS, (2) FACT THAT SOVIET VICE PREMIER LAVISHED ATTENTIONS ON HIM, (3) OUR POTENTIAL GUARANTEED HIS SURVIVAL HAS BEEN ELICITED, (4) NUMBER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES REGARD HIS MERE EXISTENCE AS MENACE, (5) DISMANTLING BASES NOW APPEARS AGAINST CASTRO'S WILL AND DESTROYS IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET HAD MADE CUBA A SATELLITE. HINDSIGHT NOW SUGGESTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE PERMIT BIGGER BUILDUP AND THEN INVADE CUBA AS PROVEN FULL-FLEDGED SOVIET MILITARY BASE.

ORIENTATION OUR POLICY THIS POINT APPEARS MORE TOWARDS SOVIET THAN TOWARDS LA PROBLEMS. PRESSURE SEEMS ALL ON SOVIET AND LITTLE ON CASTRO IF NOTHING DEVELOPING INSIDE CUBA.

SUGGEST CONSIDERATION FOLLOWING MEASURES. (1) ULTIMATUM TO CASTRO WITH BRIEF TIME LIMIT ON REMOVAL ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE ARMS AND IMMEDIATE INSPECTION. (2) ORGAN CONSULTATION ADOPT RESOLUTION ALL LA'S BREAK RELATIONS CUBA IN VIEW FAIL RE REMOVE ARMS AND ACCEPT INSPECTION. (3) INTENSIFY BLOCKADE MAKING SURE IN VIEW PAST DUPLICITY OUR GUARANTY NO INVASION CANNOT BE HONORED WHILE SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS CONTINUE AND REARMING CUBA FEASIBLE. (4) IF CASTRO REFUSES REMOVAL ARMS AND INSPECTION, CARRIED OUT INVASION.

REACTION HERE AND PROBABLY ALL LAS WOULD BE THAT SOVIET

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Handwritten signature and date 11/19/62

SECRET

-2- 541, NOVEMBER 17, 7 PM, FROM LA PAZ

RESPONSIBLE ENTIRE MESS AND THAT CASTRO HAD HIS OPPORTUNITY BUT
FANATICALLY REFUSED TAKE IT.

OUR OWN POSITION HERE RE POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES REDUCE COMMIE
INFLUENCE DEPENDS LARGE PART MAINTAINING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON
CASTRO FOR DESTRUCTION CASTRO REGIME.

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